

TOP SECRET

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(S) NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 13, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HELMS ✓
DR. DUBRIDGE

SUBJECT: List of Topics for Discussion with the
Executive Committee

Attached is an agenda listing topics proposed for discussion on June 20, 1969, with members of the Executive Committee. The purpose of this meeting is to provide the members of ExCom and the DNRO the opportunity to hold general discussions on various matters (see agenda) before the budget meetings of August 8 and 15. It is not intended to reach final decisions on agenda items but to provide for an exchange of views.

[Redacted]

John L. McLucas

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NRO

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1. Agenda, [Redacted]
2. M/R, June 13, 1969,

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[Redacted]

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See B.

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USE OF DRONES FOR PERIPHERAL SIGINT IN PLACE OF MANNED AIRCRAFT

Drones have generally been considered assets of the Air Force rather than NRP. Following the EC-121 loss a presentation was made to the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (Systems Review), Harry Davis, on the capabilities of the U-2R [] on peripheral missions. (In this instance, the U-2R was considered a National Asset rather than an NRP asset.) More recently, U-2R system capabilities and costing data information was provided to the office of the DDR&E.

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MANNED AIRCRAFT RECONNAISSANCE

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We cannot question the propriety of the proposed study of the U-2 program. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Also, the strong arguments for continuation of the U-2 program, including U. S. manned flights, have centered around its flexibility and low mission cost during crisis situations. The 26.5 per cent flying hour reduction forecast for FY71 covers both CIA and the Air Force. Since the CIA operational U-2 hours are forecast to increase significantly in FY71, the reduction is in the Air Force program.

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[REDACTED] WORKING PAPER

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Manned Aircraft Reconnaissance
Additional Comments

a) Breakdown of U-2 aircraft support submitted at a [] cost to NRP:

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U-2R Investment

IDEALIST

IDEALIST/Senior Year (Agency)

Senior Year (AF)

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[]
Film (no processing)

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[]
General R&D - Agency (only those U-2 related)

General R&D - AF (only those U-2 related)

Total

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c) Operational flying hours for U-2's (OSA submission):

FY 1969: 68.8 hrs.

FY 1971: 332.0 hrs.

Increase: 263.2 hrs.

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OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF OVERFLIGHT OF DENIED TERRITORY BY RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT

The Agency remains satisfied with the present system of Operational Control of overflight of denied territory by reconnaissance aircraft. The desire of the JCS to go directly to the 303 Committee, instead of through the DNRO, on all but satellite flights, would appear to infer that the JCS should control all manned and drone flights, including CIA assets.

In the case of CIA/JCS coordination procedures, this question appears to have been resolved at the 17 June 1969 meeting of the 303 Committee.

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COMPARISON OF CAPABILITIES AND COSTS OF VARIOUS WAYS OF
CONDUCTING CRISIS RECONNAISSANCE

This subject has been under intensive review by a special study group which included all members of the Intelligence Community. Their conclusion was that a new look must be taken with respect to the methodology to accomplish the purpose. The NRO supplied [] to SAFSP to investigate satellite techniques which could give information in periods of crisis, and assigned [] to the Agency to investigate the use of aerodynamic platforms. SAFSP, after several study programs, initiated advance preliminary designs with two contractors. In a similar way, the CIA approached this problem. Neither of these studies have yet reported back to the EXCOM via the NRO as to the feasibility of the particular proposals.

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The Agency program [] started on 27 January 1969, and will be completed on 30 September 1969. The contract is for defensive threat analysis and the establishment of survivable profiles and tactics options. It is funded for [] and a meeting will be held on 19 June [] to review the progress.

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A contract was initiated with [] in May 1969 to provide a hardware-oriented technical reference [] during their threat analysis and then to conduct a technological comparison of candidate concepts meeting the profiles and tactics formulated [] This effort funded at [] is scheduled for completion in November 1969. The second phase of the study, proposed for FY70 funding [] would involve analysis, refinement, and definition of the optimum candidate configuration in terms of hardware technology and the threat. Both contractors would be expected to participate in this second phase culminating in a fully defined program in June 1970.

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